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Abstract 
Teija Auvinen, Dimitri Lisitsyn 
Study of Paramedic Staff Safety Comparing Greater Manchester and Finland – 
observational study, 73 pages, three appendices 
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The purpose of this study was to gather information about threats and safety is-
sues from the emergency medical care personnel in Greater Manchester area 
and compare these results with the same research done in Finland by another 
research group. This thesis is a part of a bigger safety project, which was com-
missioned by The Union of Health and Social Care Professionals in Finland 
(Tehy) and The Union of Finnish Prehospital Medical Care (SEHL).  
A mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods were used in this thesis. A struc-
tured observation form was composed together with the Finnish research group. 
Consulting health care professionals was beneficial in this observation form. The 
collected data was analysed using the SPSS 24.0 software. 
The results were divided into six different themes.  The results and findings of this 
study show that the area of safety issues is wide. The most notable factor is that 
although there were not that many serious incidents, the worker has a critical part 
in occupational safety concerning many low risk safety factors. This requires co-
operation between the workers and employers. 
Keywords: occupational safety, emergency care, paramedic 
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1  Introduction 
Working as a paramedic can be demanding psychologically and physically, set-
ting a high pressure on health care workers in prehospital care all over the world. 
This pressure may cause a higher risk for workers to injure themselves or their 
colleagues. Van der Ploeg (2003) discovered that a vast majority of paramedics 
suffer from severe fatigue. Personnel working in an ambulance are in a higher 
risk of burnout according to the study done in Netherlands. The subject of staff 
safety and their health has not been studied yet in Finland, and very little across 
the world.  
This study focused on the safety of the paramedic personnel. It was a part of a 
bigger project ordered by Finnish Paramedic Association (SEHL) and Union of 
Health Personnel in Finland (TEHY). The main goal of this project was to study 
the most plausible safety risk factors for paramedic staff. This project presents 
five different master’s and bachelor’s theses. All of these theses study paramedic 
safety by using different methods.  
This study was executed in Great Manchester area as a comparison study for the 
one in Finland. Observation form was constructed with the Finnish colleagues in 
Lappeenranta during the fall of 2015. The same form was translated in English to 
be used in Manchester. This way we were able to compare the two studies with-
out any linguistic complications.  
The main purpose was to find out risk factors in paramedic staff safety. These 
include violence towards staff, slips and falls, ergonomic working conditions and 
general safety precautions to set an example. The second purpose was to com-
pare the Finnish study to the data that was obtained from this study. 
The research questions were: 
- What kind of hazardous factors may affect the safety of the paramedic staff 
in Manchester and in Finland? 
- What are the most usual hazardous factors that paramedics encounter? 
- Are there any differences and/or similarities with the Finnish study? 
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2 Emergency medical service (EMS) 
There are many different medical emergency services (EMS). In this thesis the 
medical emergency system of United Kingdom, especially Manchester’s medical 
emergency system, and Finnish medical emergency system will be presented. 
EMS has been long embodied into the history and enhanced by military conflicts. 
Ricardo Martinez (1996), believes that even though Romans and Greeks evacu-
ated wounded soldiers from battlefields using chariots, the first recorded pre-
hospital care system has to be credited to Baron Dominique Jean Larrey in 1797. 
Larrey was a chief physician in Napoleon’s army, who implemented a system that 
was designed to triage and transport the injured from field to aid stations. Later 
civilian ambulance services were developed in Cincinnati and New York City in 
1865 and 1869. EMS kept on developing and the first known air medical transport 
occurred during the retreat of the Serbian army from Albania in 1915. The EMS 
development picked up its pace and new ways to treat more critical patients were 
invented in 1960. During the same era, Belfast successfully showed that mobile 
coronary care unit ambulances were able to treat cardiac patients on scene. This 
sparked the modernization towards the EMS known today. (Martinez 1996.) 
Modern EMS provides out-of-facility medical care to urgent medical care patients. 
It works as a part of the whole health care system. EMS delivers treatment as 
part of, or in combination with, systematic approaches to decrease mortality of 
the population. (Martinez 1996.) 
This research will explain British and Finnish medical emergency systems, spec-
ifying in those regions where the observations were collected. 
2.1 Finnish medical emergency system 
The medical emergency system in Finland comprehends emergency care. Its 
main purpose is to offer rapid clinical examinations outside of hospitals, possible 
transport to a hospital and offer medical care in emergency situations. Emergency 
medical service complies with its actions to health care values, the rights of pa-
tients, acts and sections. (Metsävainio 2014, 53; Määttä 2015, 14-15.)   
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The emergency system includes instant medical treatment of a patient who has 
fallen ill or has injured themselves. It also contains preparedness of emergency 
care system and guidelines for major hazardous events in multi-official situations 
and guidance to psychosocial care. (Terveyslaki 30.12.2010/1326.) 
The emergency medical services are formed by different authorities. These are 
first responders, basic and advanced level paramedics and Accident & Emer-
gency (A&E) medical doctors. To activate the emergency medical care, the citi-
zen is required to inform about the need for help and dial the emergency number. 
The number is 112 in Finland. The public-safety answering point (later as PSAP) 
needs to see the call for help and alert the emergency medical care. (Määttä 
2015, 14-15.) 
Response categories  
Before PSAP alerts the emergency medical care, it defines the code and re-
sponse category of the mission. There are four categories all in all. 
A- level means a high-risk mission where the patient´s basic vital function is 
in great danger. 
B- level mission means that it is likely a high-risk mission but there is an un-
certainty of patient´s basic vital function. 
C- level mission means that the patient´s basic vital function is considered 
stable or the problem is minor, but assessment is needed. 
D- level mission means that the patient is in a stable condition and the basic 
vital function is not in danger, but emergency medical staff needs to make an 
assessment about the care. (Sosiaali- ja terveysministerön asetus ensihoi-
topalvelusta 340/2011.) 
The hospital district regions are divided to cover an area of one square kilometre. 
These regions again are divided into different classes of risk areas. There are five 
risk categories which are formed by the average amount of medical emergency 
calls, major highways and settlements. (Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön asetus en-
sihoitopalvelusta 340/2011.) 
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X- codes 
In 2016, Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs and Health published a report that ex-
amined nationwide emergency medical services. The report stated that almost 
900 000 medical emergency missions were in 2014 out of which there were 
66.6% - lower risk or non-threatening missions were 36.9% category C-missions 
and 29.7% D-missions. (Ilkka, Kurola, Laukkanen-Nevala, Olkinuora, Pappinen, 
Riihimäki, Silfvast, Virkkunen, Ekstrand 2016:40.) 
In Finland many patients are treated and left at home or on scene. When patient 
is left at home/scene or they are transported by other means than ambulance, 
they are categorised into X-codes. (VALVIRA 2:2014.) The categorisation is done 
by health care professionals following national and regional guidelines. Below 
different X-codes are explained (table 1) and the amount of X-codes between the 
years 2010 to 2015 (figure 1). 
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X-0 
 
Technical problem 
Car or equipment malfunction, health prob-
lems of the staff. 
 
X-1 
 
Patient was dead 
Patient was found dead. He had secondary 
signs of death. He was assessed by health 
care professional. 
 
 
X-2 
 
 
Patient was handed over to 
the police 
Patient was assessed by the health care pro-
fessional and they determined that patient 
does not require acute medical help. Patient 
was aggressive or intoxicated.  
 
 
 
X-3 
 
 
 
Patient was handed over to 
other help 
Patient was assessed by the health care pro-
fessional and they determined that patient 
does not require acute medical help. Patient 
might require some other help from other au-
thority. These are e.g. homecare nurse, dia-
betes nurse, social care worker. 
 
 
 
X-4 
 
 
 
Patient was transported by 
other means 
Patient was assessed by the health care pro-
fessional and they determined that patient can 
be transported by other means to health care 
facility. Other means meaning e.g. own vehi-
cle, relative/civilian transported the patient, 
taxi or public transportation. 
 
X-5 
 
Patient did not need medi-
cal treatment 
Patient did not need any medical treatment. 
Patient did not have any acute onset. Patient 
and their vitals were assessed by the health 
care professional. 
 
X-6 
 
Patient refused treatment 
Patient refused treatment, even though health 
care professionals advised otherwise.  
 
X-7 
 
Patient was not found 
The patient was not found at the given loca-
tion. 
 
 
X-8 
 
 
Patient was treated at 
scene 
Patient was assessed and treated at the 
scene by health care professional. Patients 
medical problem was resolved and patient did 
not need any transportation to the health care 
facility. 
 
X-9 
 
Stand down 
Delivered usually by medical dispatch or field 
manager to working brigade. 
 
Table 1. X-codes explained. (Määttä 2015, 58-63.) 
 
Ilkka et al. show in their report that the number of patients that are categorised 
with X-codes has been gradually rising. All usage of X-codes between 2010 and 
9 
2015, has risen almost 15%. More importantly the X-8 calls, where patient is 
treated at the scene and did not require to go into any medical facility after the 
call, has risen almost 5%. This is due to the enhancement and development in 
homebased services that paramedics provide with the help of consultation of 
leading doctor (figure 2). (Ilkka et al. 2016.) 
 
 
Figure 1. The percentage of X-5, X-8 and overall X-codes from all emergency 
medical missions during the years of 2010-2015. The red line meaning all X-
codes, blue line meaning X-5 and yellow line meaning X-8. HUS and Mid-Fin-
land's medical regions were not included due to the missing code data. (Ilkka et 
al. 2016:40.) 
 
Different level of emergency medical care 
Emergency medical services consist of a first response unit, basic level paramed-
ics, advanced level paramedics and in some regions also a medical unit. At least 
one extra unit is always sent out to high risk missions to assist in procedures. 
(Castrén, Helveranta, Kinnunen, Korte, Laurila, Paakkonen, Pousi and Väisänen 
2012.) 
The first response unit is alerted if the patient is a high-risk patient and it is likely 
that it would be the first unit to reach the target. First response unit is not an 
ambulance or a paramedic but some other unit of medical services (volunteer fire 
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brigade for an example.) The first response unit can be anyone or anything that 
has made an agreement with health care. (Castrén etc. 2012.) 
The most familiar units of first response are rescue units. Police and border pro-
tection can also practise first response if needed and voluntary maritime rescue 
operates in archipelago. (Määttä 2015, 14-15.) 
Social- and Health Ministry act of emergency medical care state that at least two 
of the personnel member have completed a first response course if working as a 
first response unit. (Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön asetus ensihoitopalvelusta 
340/2011.) 
Being a basic level paramedic means that the personnel have enough education 
and knowledge to take care of patient´s basic vital functions during transport. 
Basic level paramedics can start simple life saving procedures if needed and use 
limited types of medication on patients. (Ensiho1itojärjestelmä, Itä-Uudenmaan 
pelastuslaitos 2011.)  
Basic level brigade (table 2) consist of two members in which at least one is a 
health care professional by vocational education specialized in emergency med-
icine. The other can be a health care professional or a fireman. (Sosiaali- ja ter-
veysministeriön asetus ensihoitopalvelusta 340/2011, section 8.) 
Advanced level paramedics work as a two personnel brigade (table 2). The re-
quirement for an advanced level brigade is that at least one of the staff members 
is a health care professional that is a bachelor level paramedic or registered nurse 
with specialisation in emergency medicine. The other member can also be an 
advanced level paramedic or at least a health care professional by vocational 
education or a fireman. Advanced level paramedics have a wider knowledge and 
range of medication to use to treat the patient efficiently than the basic level does. 
(Castrén et al. 2012.) 
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Table 2. Differences between emergency medical brigades. (Sosiaali- ja ter-
veysministeriön asetus ensihoitopalvelusta 340/2011, section 8.) 
 
Primary care setting in emergency care states every hospital district to have an 
around- the- clock working field management. Field managers work under the 
auspices of an A&E emergency medical doctor and the doctor who answers to 
the whole emergency medical services. (Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön asetus 
ensihoitopalvelusta 340/2011.) Field managers are superiors to other emergency 
care units in situations that have multiple patients and during a multi authoritative 
missions. They are advanced level paramedics by profession, which allows them 
to be an additional support to other paramedic units. Field managers can help the 
Emergency Response Centre (later preferred ERC) in high peak missions by re-
directing missions to other units or prioritising missions. (Castrén et al. 2012.)  
Organization of the emergency medical care 
Health care act states that the municipalities have the responsibility of organizing 
emergency medical care in hospital regions. The emergency medical services 
are provided by joint municipal authorities in hospital districts in Finland. The 
emergency medical services are planned and implemented in cooperation with 
units providing emergency medical care as to form a regionally coherent system. 
•At least two person brigade.
•Mininmum requirement for skill: first response course.
First response - brigade
•Two person brigade.
•At least one health care professional (vocational education) with specialisation in emergency 
medicine.
•Other personnel at least health care professional (vocational education) or fireman (rescuer-
education).
Basic level - brigade
•Two person brigade.
•At least one health care professional ( Paramedic, bachelor level or registered nurse with 
specialisation in emergency medicine 30ETC).
•Other personnel at least health care professional (vocational education) or fireman (rescuer 
education).
Advanced level - brigade
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Joint municipal authorities for hospital districts may provide emergency services 
in their areas, in the parts of those areas or through in-house personnel, in coop-
eration with the regions rescue services or joint municipal authorities for other 
hospital districts, or by outsourcing the services to other service providers. (Ter-
veydenhuoltolaki 1326/2010, section 39.) 
The hospital districts that have special responsibility areas, have to collaborate 
to organize specialized medical care. Districts that manage the University hospi-
tals (figure 2) need to arrange special level nursing in their remit due to special 
healthcare act 9. (Terveydenhuoltolaki 30.12.2010/1326.)  
 
Figure 2. Pathway of an acute medical patient. (ESH regional draft, published in 
Finnish entrepreneurs summary report regarding emergency medical services 
2016. (Translated) 
 
The standard of service in medical care is set in the federation of municipalities 
of hospital districts. Its purpose is to define the content of emergency medical 
care to be efficient, on demand and properly measured. The standard of service 
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takes notice of different views of different authorities. This is based on risk anal-
ysis of the population of the area and its age demographic but also rural living, 
travelling and public commute. The analysis acknowledges risks of accidents, 
casualties and local factors such as natural factors and illnesses. (Sosiaali- ja 
terveysministeriön asetus ensihoitopalvelusta 340/2011.)  
Hospital and health care regions are supervised and assessed by Regional State 
Administrative Agencies (AVI) and National Supervisory Authority for Welfare and 
Health (Valvira). These supervisory agencies are governed by Finnish Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health (STM). Valvira and AVI are also responsible for testing 
and managing health care professionals work permits. The supervisory chain is 
shown below in table 3. (Regional State Administrative Agencies – Healthcare 
2017; National Supervisory Authority for Welfare and Health, Web – Valvira 2017; 
Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs and Health – Health Services 2017.) 
 
Table 3. Finnish supervisory chain in emergency medical services. (AVI – 
Healthcare 2017; VALVIRA Web – Valvira 2017; STM – Health Services 2017.) 
 
 
Finnish Ministry of 
Social Affairs and 
Health
• Divides national health care budget.
• Supervise VALVIRA and AVI.
National Supervisory 
Authority for Welfare 
and Health (VALVIRA)
• Supervising and evaluating AVI.
• Advising and managing health care professionals and hospital regions in law binding documentation.
• Governs and manages public and private health care sector and its professionals working permits and legality.
• Medical technologies and equipment.
Regional State 
Administrative 
Agencies (AVI)
• Managing health care and hospital regions.
• Managing and supervising legality of private health care sector.
• Projects and development planning.
• Resolving complains and legal issues regarding health and social care.
• Government subsidies and compensations for used health care services. 
Hospital Region
• Planning, regulating and producing the emergency medical care.
• Outsourcing to private sector if needed.
• Standardization and quality management of the medical emergency equipment and medical emergency vehicles regionally.
• Leading the emergency medical services in own region.
• Planning and developing guidelines for multiauthority missions.
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Multi agency cooperation 
The task of an Emergency Response Centre is to produce ERC services. One of 
its main functions is to provide support to fire and rescue services, police and 
social officials. This happens by redirecting an emergency notification or a mis-
sion to right officials. (Laki hätäkeskustoiminnasta 692/2010.) 
According to Finlex, Rescue act (379/2010) the state and municipal authorities, 
public utilities and institutions are obliged to take part in the planning of rescue 
operations under the guidance of the rescue service. They are required to work 
in a way that rescue operations can effectively be carried out during accidents 
and hazardous situations. Rescue operations are always lead by rescue author-
ities on accident sites. If other units take part in these situations, such as the 
police and health care authorities, rescue officials have command over these 
units. If a major accident occurs, a special command centre can be set up to act 
as a base centre for the lead of the rescue services and any experts required. 
(Pelastuslaki 379/2010.) 
Finlex, Border Guard Act (578/2005) also states that border guards take part in 
other rescue missions and in the search of a missing person in open country, or 
in need of immediate help. This by making equipment available to use, enough 
personnel and expert services, if this is considered necessary in view of the scale 
or special nature of the accident or emergency. The border guard may also per-
form urgent ambulance services if the authority or ambulance service provider 
responsible for the service is unable to do them without endangering the rescue 
missions. (Rajavartiolaki 578/2005.) The same Act oblige the Army to operate 
likewise in the same kind of situations. 
“The Police are responsible for searching a missing person in land areas and 
inland waterways cordoning dangerous areas and performing other duties con-
cerning the maintenance of order and safety at accident sites” (Pelastuslaki 
379/2010). The police need to offer help to other officials, if these are prevented 
to implement their duties.  
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Welfare and health authorities and the agencies in the relevant administrative 
sector are responsible for organising emergency medical care, services concern-
ing psychosocial support as well as the services and accommodation of those in 
distress as results of accidents (Pelastuslaki 379/2011). 
Emergency medical services cooperate with other officials through public author-
ity network identified as VIRVE. It is used by all officials as a key communication 
network in Finland. It is based on Terrestrial Trunked Radio, TETRA, and it oper-
ates as a professional mobile radio and a two-way transceiver. TETRA was spe-
cifically designed for the use of government agencies, emergency services like 
police officials, fire departments and ambulance services. The officials have dif-
ferent channels of the network to use, but it is easy to switch between them. This 
enables fluent cooperation between different authorities. (Laki viranomaisverkon 
käytöstä 13.1.2015/10.) 
2.2 UK Emergency medical service 
The emergency dispatch system with 999-number was taken to use in 1937. This 
was due to quicken the response of emergency personnel after a fire in London. 
This was the start of the UK emergency dispatch. (Garry Holland 2010.) There 
were more than 8.5 million calls to 999 between the years 2013 and 2014. Out of 
these calls, 6.3 million were redirected as missions to correct emergency author-
ities. The missions were classed as response category A in 45 % of the calls (Red 
1 and Red 2). (Ambulance Services, England 2013-14.) 
The medical emergency dispatch response categories are following; 
A [Red 1 (Purple), Red 2], B [Green 1, Green 2] and C [Green 3, Green 4]. (Turner 
2008) These are also explained in figure 3. 
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Figure 3. UK response categories explained. (North East Ambulance Service, 
NHS Trust, 2011.) 
 
In the year 2014, 111-non-emergency number was officially launched (Pope, 
Turnbull, Jones, Prichard, Rowsell and Halford 2017). Patients can call this num-
ber in non-emergency medical situations and if they need advice regarding their 
health and health care. National Health Service (NHS) 111 is available for 24 
hours a day. Trained and qualified dispatchers answer all the calls. An NHS 111 
- dispatcher works together with health care professionals to assess and give 
correct advice to the patient. When the patient calls 111, the dispatcher will go 
through a question-based pathway to determine what kind of help the patient re-
quires. If the patient falls off the pathway, the dispatcher will consult the medical 
health care personnel. This is usually either a nurse or a paramedic working the 
NHS 111-centre. The health care professional will call back to the patient. They 
will make a more thorough assessment of the problem with the patient.  (NHS 
111 – service, NHS Urgent and emergency care services in England 2015.) 
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In urgent cases, the NHS 111- dispatcher can connect the health care profes-
sional straight to the call or redirect the call to ambulance services. This will ex-
clude the 999- dispatch centre. 111- call centre will receive most of the 999- call 
centre C-category calls. These C- category calls make the 25 % of incoming 999- 
emergency dispatch calls. NHS 111 also tries to relieve the pressure from A&E 
by advising the patient with their health care problems and redirecting them to 
right facilities. (Cambridge and Petersborough Clinical Comissions Group, NHS.) 
This pathway is described in figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Patient pathway in UK emergency medical care. 
 
In United Kingdom, there are ten regional based ambulance trusts that provide 
emergency medical care. In United Kingdom, there are private practice ambu-
lance services and ambulance services under NHS trusts. (NHS, Ambulance Ser-
vices 2017.)  This study was done under specific NHS trust in North West Ambu-
lance- district in central ambulance station of Manchester. 
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There are many different levels of emergency health care personnel. These lev-
els are emergency medical technician EMT 1, EMT 2, paramedic, senior para-
medic, advanced paramedic and consultant paramedic. (Figure 5.) 
 
Figure 5. Different levels of education in UK. (Paramedic Career Framework 
2017, College of Paramedics.) 
 
An EMT 1 (Emergency Medical Technician) are lower level qualified emergency 
medical personnel. EMT 1 – course and training is 13 months. Out of these 13 
months, EMT-students will spend 18 weeks in the classroom. An EMT can treat 
common trauma and clinical patients non-invasively. EMT role is to assist in the 
prehospital clinical care and transportation together with their partner. They also 
will be able to provide basic life support (BLS), basic respiration and airway man-
agement and minimal drug therapies. (FAST-Services, EMT Course 2017; 
NWAS-careers, EMT 1 2017.) The Emergency Medical Technician is equivalent 
to Finnish basic level paramedic. 
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A Paramedic is a university educated and a diploma level emergency medical 
care professional (figure 6). The paramedic level worker is an autonomous prac-
titioner who can treat and assess patients using invasive skills. The paramedic 
has the right to work as a clinical lead, until higher educated medical personnel 
arrives on scene. Usual staff in a brigade is one paramedic and one EMT1 / 
EMT2. Some paramedics, with more field experience, also work in Rapid Re-
sponse Vehicles (RRV) which can be a motorcycle, car or a bicycle. (NHS, Am-
bulance Services 2017; NWAS-careers, Paramedic 2017; College of Paramed-
ics, Career Framework 2016.) 
Between the years 2016 and 2017, there was a new reform of the educational 
plan. This reform stated that in order to become a paramedic, the applicant must 
get a BSc (Hons) – degree that consists of three years of university education. 
A Specialist paramedic (SP) has at least a BSc degree or studying towards this 
degree – level paramedic (figure 6). An SP work most of the time as a solo re-
sponder on a RRV.  A SP can use advanced clinical skills and have access to 
additional drugs. These vehicles come first on scene or as a backup for ambu-
lance brigades. They are often sent to a more complex calls of a category A and 
B – missions (Red 1, Red 2 and Green 1). Senior paramedics evaluate the ur-
gency of the patient and give necessary emergency medical treatment. An SP 
will also take a clinical lead on missions with ambulance brigades and will assist 
in advanced medical cases. (NWAS-careers, Senior Paramedic 2017; College of 
Paramedics, Career Framework 2016.) 
An Advanced paramedic (AP) has at least a MSc degree or studying towards 
to it (figure 6). An APs are experienced autonomous paramedics who have deep-
ened their study and skill set therefore be able to fulfil more advanced clinical and 
managerial duties. They are responsible for the administrative tasks, provide a 
level of leadership and are responsible for mentoring as a clinical supervisor. 
They also provide specialist consults and referral to paramedics on calls via mo-
bile phone. They can also respond to the call with his own vehicle and take clinical 
lead in multi-casualty / multi-authority calls or in difficult medical cases. (College 
of Paramedics, Career Framework 2016.) 
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A Consultant paramedic (CP) is a paramedic who has completed his doctorate 
(PhD) in paramedic science (figure 6). CPs are responsible for regional develop-
ment, research and administrative tasks. They work as an executive level, devel-
oping new care pathways, while working together with central health policy mak-
ers. They also play role in teaching and education of paramedics and their skills. 
If wanted, they also can attend extremely difficult medical cases with their own 
vehicle or partake in a clinical operational shifts. CPs can provide on call advice, 
clinical leadership and guidance to ambulance brigades on the field via mobile 
phone or arriving on scene. (College of Paramedics, Career Framework 2016.) 
 
Figure 6. Different levels of paramedic education. (Paramedic Career Framework 
2017, College of Paramedics.) 
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3 Work safety and the protective measures  
Work safety, in sense, is organising working conditions and the environment as 
safe as one can. Preventing hazardous situations has a great deal in the staff´s 
wellbeing. The employer is obligated to take care of the staff, and is assumed to 
be a professional in their field and to know all the adverse factors in it. The safety 
and coping of the staff is crucial considering work safety. The key to influence 
work safety and its culture, is by educating the personnel. This should prevent 
injuries. The physical and mental capacity of the staff is also crucial to work 
safety. There is set a law about work safety. Its purpose is to improve the working 
conditions and surroundings to ensure the personnel´s working conditions, to pre-
vent incidents, occupational disease and physical and mental illnesses. (Työtur-
vallisuuslaki 23.8.2002/738.) 
The law of work safety has a lot of individual acts about the threats and danger 
considering working life. The work safety is a co-operation between the employer 
and the employee. The employee is obliged to precautionary, instructions, not to 
cause any harm to other workers and to inform if one notices any shortage in 
work safety or its device. In short, the work safety has a long-lasting outcome. 
(Työturvallisuuslaki 23.8.2002/738.) 
Work safety culture 
In general work safety culture is always determined by the workplace, and within 
the values that are seen important to guarantee a safe setting to work. The culture 
of work safety is guided by law and professionally. (Työturvallisuuslaki 
23.8.2002/738; Sosiaali- ja Terveysministeriö, 2016.) Work safety culture is 
formed by actions in work community and organization. Two of the key state-
ments are to deal and acknowledge the work safety factors. (Reiman and Oe-
dewald 2004.) 
The work safety culture is not only limited to laws and acts, but it is very vast 
altogether. It is motivating if everyone, despite their job description, do their part 
to keep increasing work safety. This way the culture of safety is much stronger. 
It takes perseverance to build, maintain and change the work safety culture. De-
veloping a safety culture, its main points are the atmosphere in a working place, 
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the meaning of co-operation, management, dedicated employees and safety ed-
ucation. (Tikander 2013, 21-29.) 
Safety culture is a flexible and dynamic state, which makes it even more difficult 
to comprehend without any meters to measure it. It is something that one can 
influence on the outside or inside. (Reiman et al. 2008; Pietikäinen, Reiman and 
Oedewald 2008.) Safety, team work, attitude of the management, job satisfaction, 
or environment and stress identification are some of the parameters taken into 
the safety culture of paramedicine (Patterson, Huang, Fairbanks and Wang 2010, 
3). 
 4 Work safety factors in paramedicine 
“Almost all emergencies start the same way. A call, a map and a response time 
that can mean life or death.”, narrates Gilmour in his video documentary called 
Paramedico (2013). Usually mission starts with an emergency call (999- call in 
Great Britain, 112- call in Finland). This results in an emergency mission, meeting 
the patient, treating him/her and possibly transporting the patient to hospital if 
needed. (Ilkka et al. 2016.) This thesis does not only observe this chain of events 
but also other factors that may affect the safety of paramedics.  
In this thesis, different safety factors are managed through an emergency care 
process. We will use the help of Masters Degree´s thesis written by Jauhanen, 
Pätilä and Van Riel (2016) where the emergency care process is split to factors 
dependent on the employee, employer, patient and environment. 
Safety factors are divided into themes and were used to construct an observation 
form. To set an example of these: 
 Communication between co-workers 
 The behavior of relatives and bystanders 
 Road safety  
 Resources offered by the employer       
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On route 
 
An actual paramedic mission starts when an emergency care unit is alarmed for 
duty. The emergency care unit receives prerequisite about the mission from the 
Emergency Response Centre (later ERC). The prerequisite consists of disease, 
symptom and disability categories, the urgency, knowledge of the location and 
possible phone number of the caller. It also informs if the property is a place to 
be extra cautious about. This way the emergency medical team can ask the police 
to help them on the mission. If the mission is a violent one, the ERC will automat-
ically send police there. The police will be the one to take control of this sort of 
mission and medical team cooperates with them. (Castrén et al. 2012.) 
It is not always possible to confirm the subject to be safe in advance. The person 
might be someone who has not been treated before and this way there is no 
knowledge if the patient is aggressive or violent. The prerequisite can be very 
limited or lack entirely. (Aalto, Castrén and Rantala 2008.) 
Paramedics could be exposed to many kind of infections and transmitting dis-
eases. For example, if the information about a transmitting disease does not 
reach the ERC, the lack of information means that the paramedic team does not 
use the required equipment for protection. (Murtonen and Toivonen 2006.) 
At scene 
Proactive activity starts with the placement of the car. While working the para-
medic should always make sure that they are safe. When going to a patient´s 
home the door should always be left open and an escape route noted. (Castrén 
et al. 2012.) 
Threat and risk situations may be formed from poor anticipation. The patient or 
an outsider may cause a threat, animals and inadequate ergonomics can also 
produce harm. To improve safety, co-workers should tell if they see something 
that might become a threat situation. It is not only the patient´s health at risk but 
also the health of the care personnel. That is why communication between part-
ners is crucially important (Euroopan kommissio 2013.) 
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Patterson et al. state (2013) that “Many fail to develop positive teamwork behav-
iours such as trust, back- up behaviour, and closed-loop communication because 
of an inability to maintain the dyad due to absences, sick leave and turnover. The 
average EMS worker accumulates more than 19 different partners annually, with 
some having more than 50 different partners in one year.” (Patterson et al. 2013.)  
The purpose of communication is to share information. Non-verbal communica-
tion is also essential. Communication is a great part of Crew Resource Manage-
ment = CRM. It maintains the knowledge of the situation, validity of work and its 
rationality. This helps to decrease human factors but also improves leadership 
(Euroopan kommissio 2013.) 
Ergonomics is a crucial part in moving the patient from the floor to a stretcher and 
into an ambulance. The paramedic unit can ask the fire department to assist in a 
difficult transfer of the patient. This might happen when the patient is very obese, 
the working environment is difficult or it is hard to reach or if the patient is a multi-
trauma patient. Specially in winter the dark, snow and ice form a risk to slips and 
falls. (Murtonen and Toivonen 2006.) 
Violence is a rare but genuine risk in paramedic work. Boyle, Koritsas, Coles and 
Stanley studied violence in Australia in 2007. Employees who responded to the 
study, 87.5 % told that they had encountered violence in work. The most common 
form of violence was verbal but 38 % said that the violence they have experienced 
was physical. Other forms of violence were sexual harassment and assault. 
(Boyle et al. 2007.)  
Rasimus states that more than 50 % of Accident & Emergency nurses say that 
mental fatigue is a risk factor at work. The workers cannot control their behaviour 
sufficiently when tired. The same study says that the staff provoked patients with 
their own behaviour. (Rasimus 2002.) 
The increase of problematic situations has also something to do with the public´s 
alcohol and drug behaviour but also the increase of mental health patients. It is 
almost impossible for paramedics to avoid dangerous situations or the influence 
of violence. These situations are normally associated with the person who needs 
help from the emergency care unit. (Murtonen and Toivonen 2006.) 
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Transportation with/without patient  
Patient delivery means that the patient will be transferred to a follow-up care into 
a hospital. Transfer will cause some movement and discomfort to the patient. 
During this the paramedics are close to the patient and in this way they are more 
vulnerable if the patient behaves aggressively. Transferring the patient always 
requires paramedics to be on alert. Vigilance, professionalism and experience 
contribute to reduce any hazardous situations. (Sosiaali- ja Terveysministeriö 
2016.) 
Road safety plays a huge part when driving and transferring the patient because 
paramedics mainly travel among other traffic. When driving fast with the alarms 
on, paramedics are allowed to break the Act of road traffic considering speed. 
Other times they need to follow normal traffic rules. (Tieliikennelaki 
3.4.1981/267.) A good driver knows that great speed and unnecessary risk taking 
do not shorten the duration of the trip (Castrén et al. 2012).  
Usage of safety belts will improve the safety of paramedics while driving. It is not 
always possible to use seat belt while treating the patient in the back of an am-
bulance. This is still paramedic´s own choice not to use safety gear. (Murtonen 
and Toivonen 2006.) People travelling without safety belts are in a great risk of 
dying or getting badly injured during a crash (Becker, Zaloshnja, Levick, Guohua 
and Miller 2003). 
Seat belts have prevented over 280.000 casualties and 7.2 million injuries over 
the last 35 years in the United States of America. Seat belts have also saved 1.2 
trillion in U.S dollars in economic costs. The same period showed that lack of seat 
belts caused 367.000 unnecessary deaths and major preventable medical costs. 
(U.S Department of Transportation 2010.)  
At hospital  
During the patient handover to the hospital, patients are often moved from the 
stretcher to a hospital bed. Proper working ergonomics and using tools lessen 
physical strain. It is important to take notice in working ergonomics because par-
amedics are exposed to physical strain during the transfer of the patient. This will 
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have an effect on the ability to work in long haul. (Sosiaali- ja Terveysministeriö 
2016.) 
Reichard and Jackson 2010) say that different kind of injuries like strains and 
sprains were the major injuries among EMS, firefighters and police officials 
(Reichard et al. 2010). Lifting and moving the patient are prominent causes for 
paramedics to get hurt (Patterson, Anderson, Zionts and Paris 2013). Studies 
also show that paramedics have a 2.5 times higher risk to work related injuries 
than other professions (Maguire, Hunting, Smith and Levick 2002).  
Anticipation  
All safety factors in primary care are not directly related to the things that para-
medics do in emergency care. These include, for example, security equipment 
inspections, both personal and work equipment such as car inspections. One im-
portant safety factor is suitable and appropriate clothing. The employer is obliged 
to provide the worker with work clothing and adequate protective equipment to 
enable him to carry out his work safely. (Työturvallisuuslaki 23.8.2002/738.) 
Paramedic´s clothing includes a shirt and a jacket, trousers, safety boots and 
winter clothing. Other protective equipment includes a safety vest, helmet and 
infection protection. A carbon monoxide meter is an important tool because car-
bon monoxide is odourless and tasteless, and this way very hard to detect without 
proper equipment. Carbon monoxide will stick to haemoglobin of the blood cells 
and supersede oxygen molecules. Exposure of carbon monoxide is common in 
houses that have wood burning stoves/ovens. (Salomaa 2016.) In emergency 
care the employee is exposed to mental and physical stress, which is more bur-
dened than physical stress alone. The Emergency Centre will alert emergency 
care units in a certain order and do not necessarily distribute tasks evenly be-
tween the units. This helps to prevent work stress and to promote endurance at 
work. (Työterveyslaki 2016.) 
It is also important to notice that the paramedics should not let themselves get 
too tired or overloaded by work. Lack of sleep or stress may affect the ability to 
work in a disadvantageous way. (Euroopan komissio 2013.)  
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A study made in Iran 2012 describes that some paramedics suffer from posttrau-
matic stress disorder. Many paramedics respond to traumatic cases that may af-
fect their psyche. Stress, fatigue and working under pressure will increase the 
hazardous risk factors and may cause a safety breach in working shift. (Iran-
manesh 2012.) 
4 Aims and the research questions 
Our purpose was to find out main hazardous factors via observing what may dis-
able or weaken prehospital workforce. These mixed methods study helped us 
determine concrete problematic factors in the field.  
We compared our results to the one done in Finland with the Finnish study team, 
and determined similarities and differences between these two theses. This way 
we were able to choose the best of both studies.  
More specifically, the research questions were: 
- What kind of hazardous factors may affect safety of the paramedic staff in 
Manchester and in Finland? 
- What are the most common hazardous factors that paramedics encoun-
ter? 
- Are there any differences or similarities with the Finnish study? 
One of the purposes of this study was to find out key factors that reduce the safety 
of the emergency staff. Due to the problems that we discovered in the field, we 
may suggest solutions that will eliminate some of these risks. The study did not 
observe patient safety. 
5 Methodology   
Research data is gathered and analysed by using both qualitative and quantita-
tive methods. The data was collected in Manchester Central station in North West 
Ambulance Services (NWAS). The comparative data was collected by another 
research group in Finland. Three different regions were observed in the Finnish 
research. These regions were Southern Karelia (EKSOTE), Southern Savonia 
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(ESSOTE) and Tampere region (Pirkanmaa). People in both research groups 
were a part of the planning process of the study. While gathering their data and 
evaluating results, the research groups tried to remain punctual, objective and 
truthful to the process. 
In quantitative observational research, the most suitable way would be systematic 
observation. This usually is done by using structured planning and standardiza-
tion of the observational form. (Vilkka 2014b.) 
Triangulation methods were applied to our research. This means that multiple 
researchers were a part of the data collection process (Saaranen-Kauppinen 
2006). In this research it meant that five researchers were part of the observing 
team. One researcher collected the observational data (103) in Manchester and 
other four were collecting data all around Finland. With triangulation method we 
obtained much higher amount of data. The amount would have been impossible 
to obtain with only one observer in the given time. 
The process of the research is explained in figure 6. First, was the collection of 
theoretical background and the designing of the observational form (appendix 1). 
The second step was the collection of the data. Data was analysed using IBM 
SPSS 23 – program. The results were discussed and published. 
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Figure 7. The research process. 
 
5.1 Design of the observation form 
Planning of the observation form and the timetable was done with care and with 
the help of research on the topic of staff safety. Paramedics from the NWAS and 
EKSOTE were interviewed regarding their views on safety factors. The audio of 
the interview was recorded with the permission of the interviewees. The obser-
vation form had to be designed by the research teams due to the nature of the 
research. Teams did not encounter any existing research that had been done 
using similar methods. Teams received outside help, regarding the design of the 
form from two master degree students. These students had a longer field experi-
ence of prehospital care and acute care. This way they could evaluate the logic 
of the observational questions. 
Vilkka (2014a) quotes Grönfors (2001) in her publication that with observation of 
human behaviour and actions there should be beforehand planning of different 
situations. These situations should be written down in notes and explained how 
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these situations are handled. When designing the observation form two research 
teams had five different meetings with supervisors and co-partners, regarding the 
planning of the form. The observational form was also sent via email for evalua-
tion and any comments to the Southern Karelian manager of the emergency care. 
There were also many meetings between two research teams. Based on these 
meetings the observational form was developed to observe vast areas of staff 
safety. Meetings also helped to eliminate any room for differences in the interpre-
tation of the form. 
The observational form was also pretested in Southern Karelia Social and Health 
region ambulances. The testing was done in four separate ambulances during 
two days. After pretesting the observational form was modified twice, making the 
layout and the statements of the form easier to understand. 
The observational form was designed using Microsoft Excel. During observa-
tional shifts, forms were printed out on A4- paper. The paper version of the form 
was filled on each observed call. Observers used a pencil to fill out these forms. 
The observation form consists of 55 statements that are answered with yes/no or 
marked X. Each statement has a box for “more/other information” for the observer 
to write if needed. Statements were also divided into six main categories, sub 
categories and two appendices. These categories helped observers to follow the 
form while observing the call. They also made the analysis of the data received 
from observation shifts easier. Appendix 1 was filled once a shift per one brigade. 
Appendix 1 was observing the state of the equipment and what happened at the 
station. Appendix 2 was filled if the call consisted of multiple authorities. Table 4 
shows how the statements are categorised.  
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Category Amount of statements 
On route 12 
At the destination 19  
Transport with the patient 7 
Drop off 6 
Journey back without the patient 3 
Anticipation (Appendix 1) 5 
Multi-authority mission (Appendix 2) 5 
 
Table 4. Observation form (main categories). 
 
Statements vary in different themes. Themes were determined using theoretical 
evidence, staff / co-partners and Master-degree students’ interviews and pre-test 
observations (table 5).  
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Table 5. Observation form (themes). 
 
Some of the statements may appear twice in different sections. These are for 
example "Did the paramedic experience violence on the scene?" Or "Did the par-
amedic experience violence on route to the hospital?". These reappearing state-
ments made it possible to observe similar aspects at different time and environ-
ment.  
5.2 Collecting data 
The collection of the data was conducted in two countries, Finland and England. 
In Finland the data was collected in three different health care regions. Data was 
only collected at one station and city in England; Manchester Central Ambulance 
station. Although at this station calls were also received all around the Greater 
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Manchester. These regions were determined by the possibility of completing long 
time observations by the observers, due to status of living, working and studying 
in these regions. Regions like Southern Karelia and Manchester were naturally 
chosen due to the location of partner universities; Saimaa University of Applied 
Sciences and Edge Hill University. Due to this opportunity, from these two re-
gions, it was possible to collect bigger amount of data. 
The research group had to apply for research permits from each health care re-
gion in Finland. During this application process, emergency medical managers 
from chosen regions, regional research committee and regional field managers 
had a chance to see the observational form and become familiar with the re-
search proposal. In these regions the working paramedics were only able to view 
the Observer's statement about the research - letter (appendix 2). This letter was 
sent out or shown to the brigades where observers were collecting their data. 
In Manchester, the research group sent out the research proposal to Edge Hill 
University and North-West Ambulance Services for evaluation and permit to con-
duct research in Central Manchester Ambulance Station. The chiefs of the Cen-
tral Station had an opportunity to become familiar with the research proposal and 
the statement. These files were also send out to the workers of Central Ambu-
lance Station, due to needed explanation of the purpose of this research. 
Data was collected using observers who were 2nd year paramedic students of 
Saimaa University of Applied Sciences. These students were the same who cre-
ated the observational form and analysed the results of this study. One observing 
shift lasted 12 hours. The observers did night and day shifts in Manchester and 
Southern Karelia (table 6). Due to the regional regulations the observers could 
only take part during the day shifts in Southern Savonia and Tampere region.    
This research tried to achieve a minimum of fifty (50) observations per assigned 
research area. Even though the research team planned to send two observers to 
collect the data in Manchester, financial and permit complications made this im-
possible. Only one student was sent out to collect the data in Manchester. The 
student collected his observational data whilst completing an exchange and 
placement period in Edge Hill University. When the student was collecting data, 
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he was wearing a red uniform, signalling the paramedics that he is doing his ob-
servation shift and not the placement shift. NWAS was able to help the research 
team by arranging more observational shifts for the observer due to the compli-
cations with the second observer. The observer in Manchester was able to ac-
quire 103 – observed calls in 15 shifts. One observational shift was done in Rapid 
Response Vehicle (RRV), rest of the shifts were on Paramedic and EMT – bri-
gades. 
The second researcher was able to help out the Finnish research team by ob-
serving 50 calls from Southern Karelia, making the total amount to 100 calls in 
that area. Due to the time scheduling regulations, observations in Tampere region 
had to be collected in one week. In Tampere region there were three observers 
from both research teams collecting a total of 49 calls. In Finland, there were 68 
observational shifts. The total number of calls studied in this research was 302, 
of which 199 were in Finland (table 6). During the observations we did not ob-
serve or record any actions of individual paramedics thus making it anonymous 
regarding staff call signs or names. 
 
Region Amount of 
calls 
Observers Time of the 
year (2016) 
Southern Karelia, FIN 
100 
Sasu Oksman, 
Teija Auvinen 
June - August 
Southern Savonia, FIN 50 Annika Siiskonen June - August 
Tampere region, FIN 
49 
Dimitri Lisitsyn, 
Petri Oramaa, An-
nika Siiskonen 
October 
(week 42) 
Greater Manchester, UK 103 Dimitri Lisitsyn February – April 
 
Table 6. Collected data by regions. 
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5.3 Data analysis and storage 
This research combined qualitative and quantitative methods of data analysis. 
Observation is a multi-dimensional method that works as an independent method 
of data analysis. It also could be used integrated with other analysis methods. 
(Kylmä and Juvakka 2007.) Data was analysed using mathematical statistics and 
their correlation between different statements of the structured observation form.   
In this research, all filled observation forms were inserted into the analytic soft-
ware base. The base was designed using the observational form. All answers 
were assigned a specific number. In this study answer "yes" was assigned as 
number 1, and "no" as number 2. This way all the results were used to determine 
which categories were more probable to cause a safety hazard. All answers were 
also compared between two studied countries, which gave us a clear view of 
possible safety feature differences in these countries. All data results were dis-
played in this research using frequencies, percentages and illustrated charts. 
The data collected was analysed using the IBM SPSS Statistics 23-software; the 
same program was used by the Finnish research group. All of the forms were 
considered strictly confidential and only two students taking part in this study an-
alysed them form by form. 
All of the comparison notes, versions and data will be stored using standard qual-
ity rules with the third party. All data will be stored according to regulations given 
by Saimaa University of Applied Sciences. 
6 Results 
Observations were gathered during emergency calls (blue lights) and non – emer-
gency calls (non-blue lights). Risk categories were marked using Finnish risk 
evaluation criteria. English calls fitted for these categories following; A (Red 1 & 
Red 2), B (Green 1 & Green 2), C (Green 3), D (Green 4). 
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 A B C D All 
Suomi 14 (7.0%) 70 (35.2%) 65 (32.7%) 50 (25.1%) 199 
Manchester 61 (59.2%) 41 (39.8%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (1.0%) 103 
 
Table 7. Amount of observed calls using the risk categories A-D.  
 
In table 7, we can determine that most of the Manchester emergency calls were 
categorised as class A or B. Comparing to Finland, which had more than a half 
of the calls (57.3%) categorised as class C or D. In table 8, we observed how 
many calls were categorised using English risk categories. 
 
Red 1 Red 2 Green 1  Green 2 Green 3 Green 4 
6 55 9 32 0 1 
 
Table 8. Amount of observed calls using English response categories. 
 
Comparing call signs between countries was impossible due to different call sign 
systems. The most popular call came from NHS 111 – call sign, there were 14 
calls with different explanations in Manchester. To set an example of these com-
mon calls were abdominal pain, chest pain and nausea. Other popular call signs 
were breathing problems (7 calls) and unconsciousness or fainting (5 calls). 
In table 9, we observed the number of calls during different working hours. We 
divided time into three different segments; 
 1) 8 am until 4 pm 
 2) 4 pm until 12 am  
 3) 12 am until 8 am  
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Both countries were busiest during the daytime (segment 1). In Manchester there 
were significantly more calls during night time (segment 3) compared to Finland. 
This is basically because the research was done during the day and not during 
night time in Finland. There was a constant stream of calls in Manchester Central 
station, the largest number of calls responded during 12-hour observational shift 
was 13 for one brigade. 
 
 08.00-15.59 16.00-23.59 24.00-07.59 Altogether 
Suomi 104 (53.3%) 83 (41.7%) 12 (6.0%) 199 (100%) 
Manchester 43 (41.7%) 34 (33.0%) 26 (25.2%) 103 (100%) 
 
Table 9. Calls observed between different hours. 
 
We also observed how many patients were left at home and/or transported to the 
hospital. Due to the differences in emergency medical systems, the observer 
team had to assign specific X-codes (reasons to leave patients at home) to Eng-
lish data so it could fit the Finnish data. This way it was possible to compare the 
data. We noticed that the number of patients that were left at home, were rela-
tively similar between these two countries (table 10). In Finland, there were 35.7 
% X-code patients (71 calls) and in Manchester 35.0 % (36 calls). In Finland, 
most frequent X-codes were X-5 (45.1 %) and X-8 (25.4 %).  In Manchester, the 
most common X-codes, except stand down (X-9), were X-6 (25.0 %), X-4 (16.7 
%) and X-3 (13.9 %). 
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X-codes Explanation Finland Manchester 
X-0 Technical problem 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 
X-1 Patient was dead 1 (1.4 %) 0 (0.0 %) 
X-2 
Patient was handed 
over to the police 
2 (2.8 %) 2 (5.6 %) 
X-3 
Patient was handed 
over to other help 
0 (0.0 %) 5 (13.9 %) 
X-4 
Patient was trans-
ported by other 
means 
11 (15.5 %) 6 (16.7 %) 
X-5 
Patient did not 
need medical treat-
ment 
32 (45.1 %) 2 (5.6 %) 
X-6 
Patient refused 
treatment 
1 (1.4 %) 9 (25.0 %) 
X-7 
Patient was not 
found 
2 (2.8 %) 2 (5.6 %) 
X-8 
Patient was treated 
at scene 
18 (25.4 %) 1 (2.8 %) 
X-9 Stand down 4 (5.6 %) 9 (25.0 %) 
Altogether  71 (100 %) 36 (100 %) 
 
Table 10. Reasons for the patients that did not need transportation to the hospital. 
Number of the patients left at home. 
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6.1 On route 
We observed twelve (12) different statements in the first part of the observation 
form. The main statements were regarding the anticipation of the call. First state-
ment was regarding the information of the call given by the dispatch. Paramedics 
in both countries were quite happy with given information. In Finland only 13 (6.5 
%) calls were without sufficient amount of information, this usually was regarding 
the location of the call, the amount of people/patients, the aggressiveness of the 
patient and the need of the police. In Manchester 14.6 % of the paramedics 
thought that the given information was not sufficient enough. Only once dispatch 
was contacted on route for more information. This was observed by listening to 
the paramedics’ discussion about the call on route. (Table 11) 
Given the information of the call, paramedics have a chance to call for a backup. 
In Finland only an eight (4 %) calls required back up which was called by the 
brigade. These calls mainly required back up from the fire department (four calls), 
the police (three calls), field manager or extra brigade (1 call). From those eight 
calls, back up was received five times and declined only once. Two of the obser-
vations sheets had blank in these statements. In Manchester, 14 (13.6 %) calls 
required back up (table 11). Out of these five were provided by the Police, three 
by the Paediatric ICU and one from the fire department. Five of the calls were 
provided by another brigade due to the lack of possibility to transport the patient 
by RRV (table 11). From those 14 calls, ten eventually received their asked back 
up.  
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Statement Finland 
(Yes - answers) 
Manchester 
(Yes – answers) 
Information given about the 
mission was sufficient?  186 (93.5%) 88 (85.4%) 
Back up was requested using 
the given information? 8 (4.0%) 14 (13.6%) 
Back up did arrive to the 
scene? 
5 (62.5%) 10 (71.4%) 
 
Table 11. First statements of the observation form. 
 
The anticipation about the call were discussed in 91 cases (88 %) in Manchester. 
Comparing this to anticipation in Finland, only 43 % of the observed calls were 
discussed (table 12). The anticipation was observed only by listening to the dis-
cussions between co-workers regarding the given call and its plausible risks. This 
means that if the paramedics discussed the given call during the drive to the 
scene the observer marked this as anticipation of the call. The work roles were 
usually predetermined at the start of the shift. This is why both countries had 
answered 100 % yes on the observation form. 
 
Anticipation  
(discussion about the given call on route) 
 Yes No Altogether 
Finland 86 (43.2%) 113 (56.8%) 199 (100%) 
Manchester 91 (88.3%) 12 (11.7%) 103 (100%) 
 
Table 12. Anticipation - statement. Comparison between two countries. 
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Equipment was secured loosely (93 calls, 90.3 %) during transportation in Man-
chester. All of the two personnel brigades did not have any designated place to 
secure their equipment bag. The bag was loose on the floor or on the table. Only 
observed calls (10 calls, 9.7 %) with RRV had their equipment secured during the 
ride. The equipment was not secured on route to the destination in 46 calls (23.1 
%) in Finland. Designated place to secure their oxygen bag were not available in 
23 of the cases. 
On route to the call, seatbelts were more often used in Finland than in Manches-
ter. Paramedics wore seatbelts during the ride to the location in 83 calls (80.6 %) 
in Manchester. Paramedics wore seatbelts in 198 calls (99.5 %) in Finland. The 
results were observed and determined on yes / no basis. Even if only one of the 
paramedics did not have his/her seatbelt on, the answer was no (table 13). 
 
 
Paramedics wore seatbelts 
(On route to the location) 
 Yes No Altogether 
Finland 83 (80.6%) 20 (19.4%) 199 (100%) 
Manchester 198 (99.5%) 1 (0.5%) 103 (100%) 
 
Table 13. Seatbelts wore on route. 
 
We also observed that the paramedics wore proper safety clothing like uniform 
and boots. In both countries, 100 % of the staff wore fitting work uniforms and 
safety boots. We observed the right use of safety boots. This was done by ob-
serving whether the shoe laces were tied / zippered up or not (Table 14). In Man-
chester every working paramedic had shoe laces tied during the call, and there 
were no zippered versions of the working boots. In Finland, shoe laces were left 
untied or the shoe was not zipped up in 71 calls (35.7 %).  
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Working shoes tied / zipped up 
 Yes No Altogether 
Finland 86 (43.2%) 113 (56.8%) 199 (100%) 
Manchester 91 (88.3%) 12 (11.7%) 103 (100%) 
 
Table 14. Correct usage of working boots. 
 
In the statement regarding the usage of extra protective equipment on route to 
the destination, was the equipment observed differently compared to the Finnish 
study. In England we observed what equipment was used during the ride to the 
location. This equipment was mainly radio (103 calls, 100 %), gloves (6 calls, 0.5 
%) and reflective jacket (1 call, 0.1 %). In the Finnish study, this statement ob-
served what protective equipment was in use in the ambulance. This statement 
was misunderstood by the observer in different teams. Radios worked well in both 
countries (Manchester: 99 %, Finland 99.5 %). Only once in both countries there 
were problems with the service, which caused interruptions in radio traffic. 
One of the biggest differences in hazardous factors between the two countries 
was driving to the destination. In Manchester paramedics responded to most of 
the calls (102 calls, 99.0 %) on blue lights (table 15). Only one call observed was 
not responded on blue lights. In comparison, Finnish paramedics responded on 
blue lights quite rarely (84 calls,42.2 %). Dangerous or close call situations hap-
pened more than expected in Manchester. Eleven calls (10.7 %) had dangerous 
/ close call situations while driving to the destination, all of these calls were while 
driving with the blue lights on. In Finland, there were six (3.0 %) calls that had 
dangerous / close call situations (table 15). Only one dangerous situation hap-
pened while ambulance was not with the blue lights on. In both countries, all of 
the situations were considered as close calls. They often resulted an evading 
manoeuvre done by the paramedic driving the ambulance. Most of the dangerous 
situations were caused by the actions of the pedestrian (Manchester: 10 calls, 
Finland: 4 calls). These were usually sudden stops of the pedestrian in front of 
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the ambulance or driver pulling over the same lane in front of the ambulance. 
Both countries had one call that was poor judgement of the paramedic. Both of 
these situations were regarding high speed crossing the street causing the pe-
destrian to stop for not to be hit by the ambulance from the side. 
Statement Finland 
(Yes - answers) 
Manchester 
(Yes – answers) 
Driving with blue lights on to 
the destination. 
84 (42.2%) 102 (99.0%) 
There was a dangerous situ-
ation during the drive to the 
destination. 
6 (3.0%) 11 (10.7%) 
 
Table 15. Hazardous driving in both countries. 
 
6.2 At the destination 
There were 19 statements regarding the hazardous factors and factors regarding 
safety at the destination in the observation form. Some of the table diagrams and 
number of total calls differ depending on the statement. This is due to the fact 
that some of the calls were cancelled and the observer did not need to fill this 
segment of the form. Some of the forms were not filled out and had blank spots. 
When arriving to the destination, we observed the correctness of the information 
received from the dispatch. We compared the information received from dispatch 
and the information observed on scene, observing the number of patients/people 
at the scene, the risk of aggression and the reality of the situation assessed by 
the dispatch. From the observed calls, 179 calls (89.9 %) had the correct infor-
mation about the call responded in Finland. Compared to Manchester´s calls, 79 
of these calls (76.7 %) had the correct information when arrived to the scene 
(table 16). Most of the misinformation were either simulations (two calls), patient 
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was absent from the scene (one call), the symptoms were not as severe as pre-
sented in the information (two calls). 
We also observed the positioning of the car at the scene. The position of the car 
was taken into account in 143 cases (71.9 %) in Finland. The placement of the 
ambulance was taken into account in 91 calls (88.3 %) in Manchester. The main 
reasons for the specific placement of the car was the closeness to the patient and 
the quickness/easiness of the departure (table 16). 
Animals were rarely moved to another room. Animals were present at the scene 
in 31 calls in Finland. Out of these calls only ten (32.3 %) had the animal moved 
to another room. There were only 12 calls that had an animal present at the scene 
in Manchester. Out of these 12 calls, six (50.0 %) times the animal was moved to 
another room. Some of the animals ran away or hid from the paramedics or were 
considered harmless to humans (table 16). 
In the statement regarding the statement usage of protective equipment before 
entering the scene, we observed how the paramedics used the equipment pro-
vided. We did not observe if the scene needed any usage of the protective equip-
ment, but if it had been beneficial to the paramedic, the observer wrote it down in 
the observation form. Manchester had 77 (79.4 %) calls where paramedics wore 
more of the provided protective gear at scene or before entering the scene. Out 
of these calls, 76 wore gloves and one a reflective jacket. The paramedics used 
some kind of protective equipment at scene in 183 (93.4 %) calls in Finland (table 
16). 
One of the statements contained a question regarding securing the exit strategy. 
This was observed for example by watching if the paramedics had left the front 
door unlocked/open. In Finland, in 88 cases (46.6%) paramedics secured their 
exit strategy. In Manchester, there were 23 cases (36.5%) of the possible calls 
where paramedics secured their exit strategy. The most usual way this was done 
was by leaving the front door unlocked (Finland: 48 cases, Manchester: 22 
cases), some of the calls were in the hospital (Finland: 10 cases) or at the pres-
ence of the security personnel (Manchester: 1 case). 
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Entering the scene paramedics often use "plus one – rule." This means that there 
could be anyone hiding at the scene. We observed if the paramedics asked or 
looked around the scene for possible intruders or other existing civilians. In Man-
chester, in 75 calls (79.8 %), paramedics investigated the scene. In Finland, par-
amedics investigated the scene in 131 calls (69.3 %). We also observed if the 
paramedic removed or asked the patient to move away from any possible harm-
ing equipment or equipment that could be considered as a weapon. These could 
be sharp items like kitchen knives or blunt items like hammers. In the observa-
tions we did not observe every item as a possible weapon, although almost any 
item can be determined as one. Most common reason why this statement had 
“no”-answer was due to the lack of weapon like items at scene or visible to the 
paramedics. If there were items considered as weapons, most of them were 
noted by moving them away, handed over to the police or by the placement of 
the medical bags. These results can be observed in the table 16. 
Statement Finland 
(Yes - answers) 
Manchester 
(Yes – answers) 
First given information are 
corresponding 
179 (89.9%) 79 (76.7%) 
Placing the car was noted 143 (71.9%) 91 (88.3%) 
Exit was secured 88 (46.6%) 23 (36.5%) 
Animals were removed to a 
different room/space 10 (32.3%) 6 (50.0%) 
Before entering, staff used 
extra equipment for protec-
tion 
77 (79.4%) 183 (93.4%) 
Other civilians were noted at 
the scene 131 (69.3%) 75 (79.8%) 
Weapons/objects considered 
as a weapon were noted 
45 (22.6%) 9 (13.8%) 
 
Table 16. Results regarding the observations at scene. 
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Patients had to be moved 219 times during the observation of these two studies. 
In Manchester, patients were moved 81 times. From those moves, 77 times (95.1 
%) were done ergonomically correct. Most of the times patient helped by moving 
themselves (55 times). All in all, four times a patient was not moved in an ergo-
nomically correct way. This was often due to either the difficult location of the 
move or the agitated patient that was difficult to move. Patients were moved 138 
times in Finland. Out of these moves, 115 times (83.3 %) were done ergonomi-
cally correct. Patient was not moved in the ergonomically correct way in 23 times. 
Most commonly paramedics lifted the patient incorrectly due to a difficult pa-
tient/location. (Table 17) 
In Manchester, ergonomical assistive equipment was more often used than in 
Finland. Equipment was used 33 times (82.5 %) while moving the patient at 
scene. Most common helping equipment in Manchester was a hydraulic lift (27 
times), wheelchair (16 times) and a stretcher (10 times). In Finland, ergonomical 
helping equipment was used 91 times (65.9 %) while moving the patient at scene. 
Most commonly used equipment in Finland, was a stretcher (54 times) and a 
lifting chair (33 times). Asking for help to move the patients was seldom requested 
in neither country. Help was only asked eight times (20.5 %) in Manchester. Rea-
sons for the asked help were commonly heavy patients or mental health patients. 
Help was received six times by an outsider passing the scene. Help was asked 
six times (5.5 %) in Finland. The most common reasons were the difficult place-
ment of the patient and the help to carry the medical equipment. Help was re-
ceived four times by a pedestrian. (Table 17) 
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Statement Finland 
(Yes - answers) 
Manchester 
(Yes – answers) 
Moving the patient was done 
ergonomically correct 115 (83.3%) 77 (95.1%) 
Utilities that enhance ergo-
nomics were used during 
moving the patient 
91 (65.9%) 33 (82.5%) 
Help was asked to move the 
patient 
6 (5.5%) 8 (20.5%) 
 
Table 17. Ergonomics at scene. 
 
We also observed the amount of violence experienced by the paramedics at 
scene. We divided violence into two categories, verbal and physical. Verbal vio-
lence meets its criteria when the patient or relative starts cursing towards para-
medics or have a threatening / agitated tone. Physical violence meets its criteria 
when paramedics experience any kind of physical violence, this can be pushing, 
punching or kicking. In Manchester, there were zero calls where paramedics ex-
perienced any physical violence. In Finland, there was one call were paramedics 
experienced violence. This was caused by a patient. Verbal violence was expe-
rienced more frequently than physical in both countries. There were four calls in 
Manchester, where paramedics experienced verbal abuse. Three of these calls 
were caused by the patient and one by the relative. There were also four calls in 
Finland, where paramedics did experience verbal abuse. Two were caused by 
the patient, one by the relative and one by a civilian. These results can be ob-
served more closely in table 18. 
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Paramedics experienced violence 
(At scene) 
 Physical (Yes) Verbal (Yes) Altogether 
Finland 1 (0.5%) 4 (2.0%) 199 (100%) 
Manchester 0 (0.0%) 4 (3.9%) 103 (100%) 
 
Table 18. Violence experienced by paramedics at scene. 
 
During the observation period in both countries, paramedics did not have to press 
any emergency buttons during their call. Neither of the countries had any acci-
dents that led to the paramedic being physically injured. There were still close 
call situations in both countries. Four calls had a close call situation at scene in 
Manchester. Three of these were handling a sharp object like a needle, and once 
a picture frame fell and hit the paramedic´s head. There was one accident while 
moving the patient in Finland. In this scenario, a paramedic hit his head inside a 
car during the transfer of the patient. These results can be observed more closely 
in table 19. 
Statement Finland 
(Yes - answers) 
Manchester 
(Yes – answers) 
Staff member had an acci-
dent or a close call – situa-
tion while handling the 
equipment. 
0 (0.0%) 4 (4.3%) 
Staff member had an acci-
dent or a close call – situa-
tion during the moving of the 
patient. 
1 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%) 
 
Table 19. Accidents and close call - situations at scene. 
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6.3 Transportation with / without patient 
Patients were transported to the hospital all together 194 times. Relatively both 
countries had to transport most patients to the hospital. In Manchester, the patient 
was transported to the hospital 67 times (65.0 %) and in Finland, the patient was 
transferred to the hospital 127 times (63.8 %). 
We took notice on if the patient´s relative travelled with the patient during the 
transport. This was a big difference between the two studied countries. During 
the 36 transfers there was one relative present in Manchester. Only in two of 
these, the relative travelled with their own car. In the rest of the cases the relative 
travelled in the back of the ambulance. A relative travelled with the patient in an 
ambulance in eight of these transfers in Finland. Out of these calls, five times the 
patient travelled with the driver and three times with their own vehicle. This can 
be observed in table 20. During the drive we observed how the equipment was 
secured. The equipment in the back of the ambulance was not secured on any 
observed call during the transportation of the patient in Manchester. This was due 
to the OBS bag that did not have any designated storing place. The bag was just 
rolling around on the floor. The equipment was secured in 90 calls (table 20) in 
Finland. 
In Manchester, drivers more often asked for a permit to start moving the car than 
in Finland. Permit was asked 64 times (95.5 %). The driver asked for permit to 
move the car 80 times (63.0%) during the observation done in Finland. We also 
observed how paramedics used seat belts when transporting the patient. Only 15 
times (22.4 %) both paramedics used seatbelts in Manchester. The majority of 
the paramedics sitting in the back did not wear any seatbelts when transporting 
the patient (46 times). Comparing this to Finland, both paramedics wore seatbelts 
in 96 observations (75.6 %). Only nine of the paramedics in all did not wear seat-
belt in the back of the ambulance. This can be observed in table 20. 
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Statement Finland 
(Yes - answers) 
Manchester 
(Yes – answers) 
Family member was travel-
ling with the patient. 8 (6.2 %) 36 (53.7 %) 
Equipment was secured dur-
ing the drive. 
90 (70.9 %) 0 (100 %) 
Staff wore a seat belt during 
drive. 
96 (75.6 %) 15 (22.4 %) 
Driver asked a permission to 
move. 
80 (63.0 %) 64 (95.5 %) 
 
Table 20. Driving with patient to the hospital. 
 
During the transportation of the patient to the hospital in both countries, there 
were no cases where paramedics experienced any physical violence. There was 
only one case where paramedics experienced verbal violence during the 
transport (table 21) in both countries. The violence was inflicted by the patient. 
There were a few close calls or small accidents while transportation (table 21). In 
four (6.0 %) of these cases the paramedic had a close in Manchester. In three of 
these cases the paramedic had a misstep or shake so that it caused the para-
medic to almost fall and one case where the paramedic hit their head. There was 
only one call (0.8 %) where the paramedic, sitting in the back of an ambulance, 
had a close call situation in Finland. This was caused by a shake that caused the 
paramedic to almost fall down. There was no dangerous situation caused by traf-
fic or driving in either country while the ambulance was transporting the patient 
(table 21). 
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Statement Finland 
(Yes - answers) 
Manchester 
(Yes – answers) 
Paramedic experienced phys-
ical violence during the 
transportation. 
0 (0.0 %) 0 (0.0 %) 
Paramedic experienced ver-
bal violence during the trans-
portation. 
1 (0.8 %) 1 (1.5 %) 
Staff member had an acci-
dent or a close call – situa-
tion during the transporta-
tion. 
1 (0.8 %) 4 (6.0 %) 
There was a dangerous situa-
tion during the drive to the 
hospital. 
0 (0.0 %) 0 (0.0 %) 
 
Table 21. Dangerous situations during the transportation of the patient. 
 
We also observed the safety driving without the patient. This was when paramed-
ics had a call cancelled, left the patient at home or when they were driving back 
from the hospital to the station. There were more documented (186) cases in 
Finland than in Manchester (29). This was due to the fact that in Manchester 
paramedics received more calls in a more intensive rate. They did not have to 
drive back to the station as frequently as in Finland.  
In Manchester, securing the equipment was a problematic to observe. In this sce-
nario too, the OBS bag was on the floor without any designated place. This 
caused observer to mark every observed call as “no” in this statement. In Finland, 
there were 46 cases (24.7 %) where equipment was not secured during the drive 
without the patient (table 22). Mostly this was caused by not securing the defib-
rillator or the oxygen bag properly. Some of the calls had similar problem as in 
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Manchester. This was due to the differences in ambulance brigades depending 
on the region observed. We continued observing the usage of seatbelts during 
the return drive. In Manchester, seatbelts were worn 18 times (62.0 %) during the 
return ride to the station. In Finland there were only 3 cases where seat belts 
were not worn, overall in 183 cases (98.4 %) seatbelts were worn (table 22). 
There were also a few dangerous situations during the drive without the patient. 
In both countries there were two cases that were written as dangerous situations. 
In Manchester, both of these cases were caused by traffic or the paramedic driv-
ing. In Finland, one case was caused by the traffic, where a civilian car almost 
crashed into the ambulance. The second case was caused by a broken ampule 
that was left on the seat. The paramedic almost sat on it. These can be observed 
in table 22. 
Statement Finland 
(Yes - answers) 
Manchester 
(Yes – answers) 
Equipment secured during 
the drive. 
46 (24.7 %) 0 (0.0 %) 
Staff wore seat belts. 183 (98.4 %) 18 (62.0 %) 
There was a dangerous situ-
ation during the drive back to 
the station. 
2 (1.1 %) 2 (6.9 %) 
 
Table 22. Drive without the patient. 
 
6.4 Drop off 
One of the biggest questions during the handover of the patient to the hospital 
was ergonomics. In all of the 67 calls, (100%) the patient was moved to the hos-
pital bed or a chair ergonomically correct in Manchester. Out of these calls, the 
patient helped the paramedics 26 times by moving themselves to the bed. One-
time help was received from hospital staff. Patient was moved ergonomically cor-
rect (table 23) in 119 calls (93.7 %) in Finland. Out of these calls, the patient 
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moved themselves 17 times and twice there were helping hands from the hospital 
staff. There were eight calls (6.3 %), where the patient was moved ergonomically 
incorrect. These were caused by moving the patient with a rounded back (four 
times), moving the patient alone (one time) and moving the patient from a poor 
position (one time) to a better one.  
Due to the misunderstanding between observation groups, the question regard-
ing the usage of ergonomical assistive equipment during the patient´s drop off, 
the statement was observed differently. In Finland, this statement was observed 
as what kind of ergonomical equipment could be found in the ambulance. In Man-
chester this was observed as in what kind of equipment was used in the handover 
of the patient.  Due to this misunderstanding, we will only observe the data col-
lected from Manchester. In Manchester there were 47 calls (70.1 %) where ergo-
nomical helping equipment was used in the movement of the patient during the 
handover (table 23). Most frequently the equipment used was hydraulic lift (34 
times), stretcher (31 times), wheelchair (11), lifting cloth (16 times) and sliding 
board (4 times). 
Statement Finland 
(Yes - answers) 
Manchester 
(Yes – answers) 
Moving the patient was done 
ergonomically correct during 
the handover of the patient. 
119 (93.7 %) 67 (100.0 %) 
Utilities that enhance ergo-
nomics were used moving 
the patient. 
N/A 47 (70.1 %) 
 
Table 23. Ergonomics during the handover of the patient. 
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During the handover, we also observed the violence experienced by paramedics 
and staff personnel. In Manchester, there were significantly more cases of vio-
lence, both verbal and physical, during the handover than in Finland. There were 
three cases (4.5 %) where paramedics had to experience violence during the 
handover in Manchester (table 24). One was a physical incident inflicted by the 
other patient aka civilian, who was suffering from mental health issues. This was 
while the observed paramedics were handing over their own patient, a civilian 
punched the observed paramedic in the chest. This resulted in a situation where 
paramedics had to restrain the violent civilian onto the ground and wait until the 
security arrived. Three other cases contained verbal violence towards paramed-
ics and hospital staff. Verbal violence was caused once by the patient and twice 
by the relative. 
 
Paramedics experienced violence 
(At handover) 
 Physical (Yes) Verbal (Yes) Altogether 
Finland 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 127 (100%) 
Manchester 1 (1.5%) 3 (4.5%) 67 (100%) 
 
Table 24. Violence experienced by the paramedics during handover. 
 
We also observed if there were any close call – situations or if there were acci-
dents during the handover of the patient. In Manchester, there were three cases 
where there was a close call – situation, most of these were caused by the same 
violent patients and one was almost a slip while moving the patient. In Finland, 
there were one close call – situation. This was during the movement of the pa-
tient, when a paramedic almost fell when moving the patient out of the ambu-
lance. 
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6.5 Anticipation 
This is regarding the first appendix in the observation form. In this part we ob-
served how the cars and equipment was working, how the paramedics prepared 
for the shift and what kind of safety equipment there was in use. In Manchester, 
there was also a new hired “make ready” -company that restacked, cleaned and 
fixed the ambulances before the start of the shift. The paramedics do this proce-
dure by themselves in Finland. 
Paramedics checked the ambulance at the start of 13 shifts (86.7 %) in Manches-
ter and in Finland in 51 shifts (75.0 %). We also observed if there was any equip-
ment malfunction and if so, was it reported. There were three equipment malfunc-
tions in Manchester. Out of these one was reported to the management. One was 
replaced and one was left unreported. In Finland, eight equipment malfunctions 
were discovered. From these, two were left unreported, one was replaced and 
one did not need any fixing. This can be seen in table 25. 
Car and equipment check was performed during the start of the shift 
 Answers (Yes) Altogether 
Finland 51 (75.0%) 68 (100%) 
Manchester 13 (86.7%) 15 (100%) 
 
Table 25. Car and equipment checks at the start of a shift. 
 
CO-monitors (64 observations) were attached to OBS bags as a precaution in 
Finland. The monitor will beep if the scene has any carbon monoxide. In England 
they did not have any CO-monitors in ambulances (0 observations). We also ob-
served if the calls were redirected during the shift. The dispatch redirected the 
ambulance six times in Manchester. Twice it was during the shift and four times 
it was more than once during the same shift. In Finland, field manager redirected 
the ambulance during three shifts. Every time it was not more than once a shift. 
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6.6 Multi-agency co-operation 
We observed how the multi-agency or multi-authority co-operation was handled 
by the paramedic team and other colleagues like the fire department, police and 
social workers. Overall in Finland, there were 11 calls that had multi-authority 
personnel working on the call. In Manchester, there were only six multi-authority 
calls. In neither country during multi-authority call was there a check list used. In 
Manchester, the work distribution was clear on all six calls. In Finland, work dis-
tribution was clear on all but one (table 26).  
Changing the radio frequency to communicate with the possible other authority 
personnel was impossible in Manchester. In Finland there were five calls, where 
paramedics changed their radio frequency as ordered. There were only five due 
to the fact that all multi-authority calls do not require changing the radio fre-
quency. Paramedics received clear instructions from the authority at the scene. 
In Manchester, on all six calls, paramedics received good instructions from the 
leading authority. From these six calls, instructions were received four times from 
the police, one time from the fire department and one time from the HART-team. 
In Finland, on nine calls, paramedics received clear instructions from the authority 
in charge (table 26). From these nine calls, instructions were received three times 
from the police, five times from the fire department and once the paramedics were 
the leading authority. Once the paramedics did not receive clear instructions and 
once the observation form was blank on this statement. Patients in Finland did 
not require multi-authority presence during the transportation of the patient or 
transportation with other vehicle than an ambulance. In Manchester twice the po-
lice had to transport the patient to the nearest hospital instead of the ambulance 
(table 26). This was due to aggressiveness or suicidal intentions of the patient. 
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Statement Finland 
(Yes - answers) 
Manchester 
(Yes – answers) 
Work distribution was clear. 
10 (90.9 %) 6 (100.0 %) 
Paramedics got clear instructions 
from the other authority. 9 (90.0 %) 6 (100.0 %) 
Other authority was a part of trans-
porting the patient. 
0 (0.0 %) 2 (33.3 %) 
 
Table 26. Multi-authority operation. 
 
7 Conclusion 
Overall, this study has just scratched the surface regarding the staff safety in 
emergency medical care. Emergency care and work environment are generally 
the same in all parts of the world. According to Manchester´s data, it can be seen 
that incidents were more common in traffic than patient-related situations. Man-
chester has 2.7 million residents. The people and larger ambulances bring 
transport challenges to both paramedics and other road users. However, the big-
gest differences are in small things such as the usage of seat belts, ergonomics 
or patient-related situations. Paramedics usually discuss with each other during 
the drive on call. Often they try to anticipate what kind of situations they are going 
to encounter. This anticipation was seen in the study. The paramedics talked 
more often with each other about the sent call and even mentioning the plausible 
risks in Manchester. The paramedics in Manchester discussed about the given 
call 45.1 % more often than their colleagues in Finland. 
However, violence mentioned in the media and major car pileups are relatively 
rare. This is also reflected in this study. We noticed that the threat of violence is 
still real, Manchester had a higher percentage in verbal (3.9 % at scene) and 
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physical (4.5 % during the drop off) violence is compared to Finland. During the 
observation period in Manchester, the North West Ambulance Service received 
102 official notifications of physical violence against the paramedics and 106 re-
ports of verbal violence (figure 7). However, only a few of these situations got 
documented in the observations. Many paramedics do not even make a formal 
notification of what happens in the field. 
 
 
Figure 8. Formal documented notifications of violence inflicted on paramedics in 
NWAS from February to April 2016. 
 
Comparison of factors affecting the safety of personnel among the various coun-
tries broadens the outlook on issues related to emergency care. This gives new 
perspectives for developing emergency medical care in Finland. A good example 
would be the advancement of ergonomics in UK emergency medical care. Back 
pain and number of injuries dropped significantly when the hydraulic tailgate 
came to be a standard equipment in ambulances. Even though in our observation 
no paramedic suffered from any injuries, close call – situations were still present 
(6 % in transportation of the patients). Lower back pains are the most common 
musculoskeletal disorders which appear in 60 to 80 % of the people in some point 
in their lives. Out of these, 10 to 20 % develop into chronic illness and/ or continue 
to have chronic symptoms. (O´Sullivan 2005, Twomey and Taylor 2002.) The 
biggest risk factor noticed in Finland was lifting the patient in a carry chair into an 
ambulance through the side door. This was also seen in the Finnish study which 
had 16.7 % incorrect ergonomical lifts compered to Manchester’s 4.9 %. Euro-
pean commission (2013) guide book states that personal attitude has an im-
portant role regarding lowering the risks for musculoskeletal disorders. This was 
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also seen in the usage of ergonomic helping equipment, Manchester had much 
higher usage rate of 82.5 %. This was 16.6% higher than in Finnish observations. 
Even though there were not one specific hazardous factor that should be fixed 
right away, this study still fulfilled its main purpose and confirmed already existing 
ideas regarding the hazardous factors in prehospital medical care. One of the 
biggest differences and hazardous factors between the two studied countries was 
driving to the scene. In Manchester, most of the calls (99.0 %) were responded 
on blue lights. In Finland only 42.2 % of the calls were responded on blue lights. 
In both countries most of the dangerous situations happened during the blue light 
calls. Manchester had a 10.7 % risk rate to get into a dangerous situation while 
driving to the scene. The biggest reasons were still the civilian reactions (ten calls 
out of 11 in Manchester) in traffic when the emergency vehicle approached them. 
The same results were seen in Finnish study. 
With a higher risk of road traffic collision with an ambulance, the use of seatbelts 
cannot be addressed enough. The observation showed that even with the higher 
risk of dangerous situations, Manchester paramedics used less frequently seat-
belts when driving to the location. They used seatbelts in fact 18.9 % less fre-
quently than the observed Finnish colleagues. We also noticed that in both coun-
tries, paramedics used less seatbelts when transporting the patient to the hospi-
tal. The paramedics staying in the back of the ambulance used seatbelts in Man-
chester only 15 times (22.4 %) and in Finland 96 times (75.6 %). Although there 
were no hazardous situations during the transportation of the patient, this was 
still a significant drop comparing to the usage of seatbelts in front of the ambu-
lance. 
8 Discussion 
The aim of the thesis was to include as much reliable and truthful information as 
possible, by agreeing in advance about the observer´s role during the mission. 
The observer did not participate in the emergency care at any point, but only 
served as an observer with the staff. This was also clarified for all employees. 
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Only in a situation in which the observer´s action was necessary to save a per-
son´s life or to prevent injury, was the observer able to suspend the actual obser-
vation and participate in the mission as a basic level paramedic. 
At the request of Manchester Central and Development Managers, the research 
plan was sent to the paramedics via email. They did not see the actual observa-
tion form in order to avoid influencing the way the paramedics work. The para-
medics were also told that the study itself was totally anonymous. The paramed-
ics were not individually observed and this way they cannot be identified from the 
study or the final report.  
8.1 Limitations 
Ernest Stringer (1999) lists flowingly observable circumstances regarding action 
research: places, people, activities, events and time. Making observations is al-
ways dependent on the observer. We cannot see everything that is going around 
us, so we have to pick our observations. The observation screening will determine 
what kind of data will be analysed. (Kylmä and Juvakka 2007.) 
This form only gave subjective statement of the observer. This study did not tell 
the theme of observation to the staff. Otherwise, this may have affected the be-
haviour of the working staff and the results too. There were situations that differed 
from natural work experience because the study was a qualitative study with an 
observer on board of the brigade. This left room for a human error. 
The form also restricted the possibility to evaluate everything. That is why a spe-
cific designed box for explaining was added. All the statements that was used in 
the observation form were already defined and discussed with the Finnish re-
search group.  
There was only two observers and limited amount of time. The purpose was to 
conduct the study in as many different types of brigades as possible. 
The data was originally going to be collected and analysed by two Saimaa Uni-
versity of Applied Sciences students. Due to the difficulties with the timetable and 
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legal issues in England, there was just one student collecting the data in Man-
chester. The other student participated in the collection of the data in Finnish 
research. 
8.2 Quality and ethics 
The quality control of this study followed the standard ethics when observing in-
dividual staff members. The patients or treatments were not part of the observa-
tions and thus the study did not require patient ethical approval. In other words, 
the study only focused on the working medical staff and their safety. Patients 
were informed about the study with a cover letter, and they were entitled to refuse.   
Even though the observer is a paramedic student, he or she did not participate in 
any treatment of the patient. If the observer interfered with the mission in any 
way, he or she did not include that mission into the data for analysis. The observer 
did not give any specifics about the study, but did mention that the staff will be 
observed for the study. The study also did include a written paper that stated the 
meaning of the observer. This cleared some misunderstandings in patient treat-
ment situations.  
We also discussed with two North West Ambulance Service senior paramedics 
that helped us to define the themes and some questions for the observation form. 
Their opinions and knowledge of the regional problems helped with the observa-
tion in Manchester region.  
The quality control was achieved by storing every significant document concern-
ing this study. After the observations, the collected data was processed and dis-
cussed the possible outcome of the Finnish observations. Collecting all state-
ments properly made it possible to not to come up with early conclusions. 
The observation forms are confidential and the authors of this study were the only 
to process the forms during the analysis of the results. Original forms will not be 
released to anyone. Hospital districts and Manchester partners will be provided 
with the material, if they want it. The data was processed in a way that no individ-
ual paramedics or units cannot be identified. 
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8.3 Conflict of interests 
Even though this study was ordered by TEHY and SEHL, this research did not 
receive any funding from these organisations or any outside funding. The re-
search was done during the free time of the students and they did not receive any 
payment or salary during the completion of this study.  
There were no predetermined results that the study team tried to accomplish. 
There were no close personal relations between the observers, observed staff 
members or the patients. All of the results are in the original form and were not 
manipulated in any way. These facts stated, this study does not have any conflict 
of interests. 
8.4 Future research 
This study managed to confirm what kind of hazardous factors the emergency 
medical responders can face in their field of work. This study still had it limits due 
to the timing and funding. It was only observed during one season of the year; 
Manchester (winter) and Finland (summer/autumn). Although the multi seasonal 
observation would have given a more precise look on the problems caused by 
the different seasons of the year.  
The used observation form could be further developed to be more efficient and 
easier to understand regarding possible future research, using the results and 
comments revealed in these two studies. This way there would be less misunder-
standings between possible observers 
Using a non-systematic observation in the future, could reveal new hazardous 
factors that were not even considered in this systematic observations. Observers 
using a non-systematic approach would need to know how the emergency med-
ical system works. Emergency medical situations can develop rapidly into a pos-
sible disaster. Due to this, observers have to go through possible training regard-
ing the observations and those quick pace situations. 
One of the possible future research topics could be the usage of the developed 
systematic form in other studies completed in different countries. This way this 
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thesis could be the one to compare how some of the hazardous factors are com-
bated in different cultures, systems and countries. A paper review containing 
these studies could help the emergency medical field in better understanding of 
staff safety. 
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